Abstract
In two recent essays, Sober (2013, 2014) (hereafter R&S) argue that the proposition that a hypothesis H would explain an observation O is evidentially irrelevant to H. Where E says that, were H and O true, H would explain O, R&S's thesis is that (1) P(H|O&E) = P(H|O).
Once we know O, R&S claim, E gives us no further evidence that H is true. In other words, O screens off E from H. Call this claim the Screening-Off Thesis (SOT) (R&S 2014: 193) .
In endorsing SOT, R&S are presumably not making a claim about subjective probabilities, for an agent could virtually always assign coherent subjective probabilities on which the above equality is false. I will instead read them as making a claim about epistemic probabilities, which we can understand as rationally constraining subjective probabilities.
Theses similar to SOT are endorsed by other Bayesians skeptical of inference to the best explanation. For example, van Fraassen (1989: 166) famously denies that the claim that a hypothesis is explanatory can give it any probabilistic "bonus." Often, however, such skeptics do not make clear in precisely what way they think that explanation is irrelevant to confirmation. Van Fraassen does consider a precise version of inference to the best explanation, but it is an uncharitable one, on which inference to the best explanation is understood as a non-Bayesian updating rule on which good explanations get higher probabilities than Bayesian conditionalization would give them.
2 R&S are thus to be 2 Some explanationists have defended this rule against van Fraassen's criticisms of it (see, e.g., Douven 2013 ). However, whether or not van Fraassen's original arguments against noncommended for stating a precise anti-explanationist thesis which does not mischaracterize their opponents' position. If SOT is true, there is a clear sense in which explanation is not relevant to confirmation.
That said, we do need to clarify the scope of SOT before we can evaluate its significance and plausibility. It is widely acknowledged by Bayesians that all confirmation is relative to a context. In other words, we always have some background knowledge K, which may be left implicit but is always guiding our judgments of probability. While subjective Bayesians often think of this background as being part of the probability function P(.) itself, for epistemic probabilities, it is preferable to make K explicit as a conjunct of the proposition being conditioned on. 3 So we can rewrite R&S's claim as Bayesian explanationist updating rules work, I show in my 2016a that such rules lead to synchronic probabilistic incoherence. The argument of this paper suggests that it would be better to think of the "probabilistic bonus" that explanation gives to a hypothesis H as the degree to which the proposition that H is explanatory confirms H.
3 Making K part of the probability function itself makes it impossible to "bring out" any part of K in the way one brings out the evidence in Bayes' Theorem -i.e., where X is a conjunct of K and Y is an arbitrary proposition, the probability of X given Y will always equal 1. This leads to a version of the old evidence problem. By contrast, if K is one of the propositions conditioned on, and not part of the probability function itself, then X can be brought out in (2) P(H|O&E&K) = P(H|O&K).
Here H, O, and K are variables that could be filled in with various propositions or background knowledge, with the caveat that H is a hypothesis and O an observational statement. We can then ask: for which H, O, and K do R&S take (2) to be true?
The most straightforward interpretation of SOT is as a universal claim: for all O, H, and K, P(H|O&E&K) = P(H|O&K In the counterexample in the text K says that O&E, but not O, implies H. Hence, in the circumstances I have described, P(H|O&E&K) > P(H|O&K). briefly argue that the frequency data in K make (4) true only because they support the existence of some causal connection between smoking and cancer:
5
[T]he data indicated that there was some causal process-albeit unknown at that time-that explains the correlation between smoking and lung cancer. … Exactly this feature-a justified belief in an unknown explanatory story-plays a crucial role in 5 M&P's main claim in that paper is that even if SOT is true, explanatoriness can still play an evidential role by increasing the "resiliency" of probabilities. In my view this is based on a mistaken view about epistemic probabilities. As I understand it, the epistemic probability of H given O&K, P(H|O&K), is a relation between the propositions H and O&K, such that, if P(H|O&K) = n, then someone with O&K as their evidence ought to be confident in H to degree n. Following Keynes (1921) , I take this relationship to be metaphysically necessary and knowable a priori, like the laws of logic or mathematics. Learning new empirical information, like E, does not affect the value or resilience of P(H|O&K). The value of this probability does not change, just as whether A&B entails A does not change. Rather, learning E simply makes a new probability relevant to what we should believe, namely P(H|O&E&K), because now O&E&K describes our total evidence. using the data from observation to get justified beliefs about the relevant frequencies.
Apart from a general justified belief in some explanatory story accounting for that data, the observational data would not justify beliefs about the relevant frequencies.
Although where E is the proposition, [If (S smokes) and (S gets cancer) were true, (S smokes) would explain (S gets cancer)]. R&S claim that "a good estimate of the probability on the right [of (6)] is furnished by frequency data; the same estimate is a good one for the probability on the left" (2013: 663).
I claim that (6) I will now show that SOT* is false in this context.
First, note that This is because on the (extremely unlikely) hypothesis that there is no explanatory connection between smoking and cancer, the observed frequency data is a huge fluke. But we shouldn't expect huge flukes to continue. If the observed association of smoking and cancer is merely coincidental, then we should expect future smokers that we observe to have cancer at the same rate as the rest of the population. So if we know that ~[C 1 vC 2 vC 3 ], learning that S smokes doesn't raise the probability that S gets cancer above the probability given by the base rate of cancer in the population.
An anonymous reviewer suggests the following objection to this argument. (7) is an instance of the more general principle
P(A | B&[there is no explanatory connection between A&B]&K) = P(A | [there is no explanatory connection between A&B]&K).
However, this principle is subject to counterexample. 8 Sober (2001) observes that although there is no explanatory connection between the price of bread in Britain and the height of the sea in Venice, they are nevertheless correlated: they both tend to increase over time. As such, if K reports the bread price in Britain and the sea level in Venice historically, B says that the sea level in Venice is x at some unspecified future time t, and A says that the bread price in
Britain is y at t, then this equality is false. For example, learning that the sea level in Venice is much higher than at present raises the probability that the bread price is also much higher than at present.
Assuming that time is not a common cause of A and B, then I accept the counterexample to the above principle, but I still hold that the principle is true in the current case. For, as Steel (2003: 313) observes, "British bread prices provide information about
Venetian tides (and vice versa) only in virtue of telling us something about the time"
(emphasis his). Knowledge of the time t screens off the bread prices from the sea levels. The above principle is plausibly true when any relevant temporal information is built into our background K, which we can stipulate is the case in the smoking and cancer example.
Even if this is not right, Sober (2001: 342-43 ) agrees that separate cause explanations "often" do not predict correlations, and I think he should accept that (7) is such a case.
According to Sober, inference to a common cause is often rational because it is frequently the case that a common cause explanation predicts a correlation where a separate cause explanation does not. (Sober is considering cases where it is obvious that neither A nor B causes the other, so a common cause is the only explanatory relation available.) However, it is clearly rational to infer a causal relationship between smoking and cancer from the frequency data in K. Hence, Sober's reasoning would suggest that (7) is a case in which the above principle is true.
Here is (7) again: It follows from (7) From (8) and (9) it follows that In other words, learning that there is no explanatory connection between smoking and cancer and that S has cancer does not raise the probability that S smokes. However, according to (5), that S gets cancer raises the probability that S smokes. For (5) to be true, it must then be the case that learning that S smokes and that there is an explanatory connection between smoking and cancer raises the probability that S gets cancer. That is, from (5) and (10) From (10) and (11) 
]&K) > P([S smokes] | [S gets cancer]&K).
Presumably any one of C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 also licenses extrapolation from our frequency data. Consequently, we can replace C 1 vC 2 vC 3 with any one of C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 , and (11)- (13) will remain true. In particular, it will be true that (14) 
P([S smokes] | [S gets cancer]&C 1 &K) > P([S smokes] | [S gets cancer]&K).
(14) contradicts SOT*. So SOT* is false. cancer we observe will be a smoker. It is true that, as data accumulates, our new probabilities should tend to approach observed frequencies. But this is compatible with (14). The probability on the left-hand side of (14) is closer to the observed frequency of smoking among people with cancer than the probability on the right-hand side, but both values approach this frequency as the number of samples in K increases.
10 It is compatible with this that the order of explanation is evidentially irrelevant, in that X confirms Y to the same degree regardless of what the explanatory relationship between them Second, note that (10) and (11) We can break down the left-hand and right-hand side of (6) and (15) Nevertheless, for (6) to be true the second summand in (17) would need to exactly equal the difference between the first summand in (16) and the first summand in (17). While this could be the case, there is no reason to expect it a priori. Hence, far from being a general truth, if (6) is true in this case it is only by fortuitous coincidence.
that C 1 is false. S, for his part, does not smoke. Nevertheless, because of S's unique physiology and the chemical properties of tobacco, it is true that were S to smoke, his smoking would cause him to have cancer. In this case E is true, but C 1 remains false.
However, inasmuch as a scenario like this in which E is true and C 1 is false is incredibly unlikely, it remains extremely plausible that E confirms C 1 , even if it does not entail it.
More importantly, the negative influence of E on [S smokes] sketched above is not the kind of influence that either proponents or opponents of inference to the best explanation have had in mind when disagreeing about whether explanation is relevant to confirmation.
And if we build into K information that screens off this influence, then (15) is true. For example, imagine that we know that nothing besides smoking will give S cancer (and that S will not get cancer for no reason). In this case P(~C 1 | [S gets cancer]&K) = 0 -if the only way for S to get cancer is from smoking, then if S gets cancer it is because of S's smoking, and so C 1 is true. Hence the second summand in both (16) and (17) is 0, and the dominance of (16)'s first summand over (17)'s first summand is sufficient for it to be the case that I have argued in this paper that R&S's thesis that the explanatory hypothesis [if H and O were true, H would explain O] is irrelevant to confirmation is not true in the kind of case they discuss, at least once we fix our background knowledge so as to screen off irrelevant information. I have also shown that when we move to more tractable propositions describing explanatory connections, such as ones about general causal links between smoking and cancer, not only are these relevant to confirmation, they actually mediate the connection between observations and theories: the observation confirms the theory (and vice-versa) only insofar as we have evidence that the described explanatory connection exists. Explanation not only adds confirmation; it guides confirmation.
